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I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the following hypothetical: Don Vore is arrested by
local police following a bank robbery. Vore, a foreign national of

Germany who speaks English, is advised of his Mirandarights. He
waives these rights and subsequently confesses to armed robbery
during a police interrogation. The confession is introduced at trial
and Vore is sentenced to prison.
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While Vore is in prison, his counsel brings a federal habeas
corpus motion. 1 Vore argues that the local police, in obtaining his
confession, violated his personal rights under the Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations. 2 Vore argues that this corifession should
have been suppressed.
Counsel for the state argues that the
protections of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations do not
implicate concerns of fundamental fairness guaranteed by the United
States Constitution. Rather, the state urges the court to view the
Vienna Convention protections as special rights. In addition, the
state, relying on Printz v. United States,3 argues that the federal
government lacks authority to impose the mandates of the Vienna
Convention on local governments.
Vore urges the court to suppress the confession, arguing that
suppression is the only way an alien's Vienna Convention rights can
be protected from unlawful police actions. Further, he argues that
local governments are bound to follow the terms of the Vienna
Convention because of the federal government's constitutional power
to enter into treaties with foreign governments. The state responds
that even if the imposition of the treaty's affirmative obligations on
local governments is constitutional, the treaty addresses interactions
with foreign governments and does not create personal rights that
Vore could enforce.
Noting that this case encompasses a conflict between an
international treaty and domestic policy, the district court judge
recesses to consider the legal implications of this conflict. How
should a federal court wade its way through this quagmire in an
attempt to give force to a federal treaty and at the same time apply
the newly-minted federalism principles in Printz?
The above hypothetical illustrates the tension between the need
of the federal government to direct foreign policy in a meaningful way
and the tradition of federalism that allows the federal government
and state governments to exercise concurrent authority. 4 Under the

1.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1994) (outlining a state prisoner's right to bring
an action in federal court). A habeas corpus motion forces the state to justify its
confinement of a state prisoner. The federal court on review will analyze this
justification to decide whether the confinement violates the prisoner's rights
under the United States Constitution. Thus, habeas corpus effectively moves a
state crime into the federal arena. There are two different provisions to habeas
corpus law. While 28 U.S.C. § 2254 provides remedies for state prisoners,
prisoners who are in federal custody bring their actions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255
(1994).
2.
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol on
Disputes, done Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 (entered into force
with respect to the United States of America, Dec. 24, 1969) [hereinafter Vienna
Convention].
3.
117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
4.
See Prft&, 117 S. Ct. at 2376 (noting that the United States Constitution
creates a system of"dual sovereignty") (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (199 1)).
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U.S. Constitution, the federal government has vast powers, but some
powers are exclusively reserved for the state governments. 5 In a
situation, such as the hypothetical above, this division of power may
create a conflict between a state government's right to exercise its
reserved powers 6 and the power of the federal government to enter
into treaties.
To what extent should the federal government attain the consent
of the states before placing new obligations on them via federal
treaty? This is an important issue in criminal law because of the
potential effects on both the warnings that police would need to give
aliens upon arrest and the ability of an alien to suppress evidence
acquired in a manner contrary to international treaty. Additionally,
the issue is likely to be one of increasing importance in non-criminal
areas given the possibility, in the post-Cold War era, that treaties will
deal less exclusively with international relations and more with
domestic issues, historically the province of state governments."
This Note will explore the conflict between federalism expressed
in the U.S. Constitution and the demands that international treaties,

5.
See id. at 2376-77 ("Although the States surrendered many of their
powers to the new Federal Government, they retained 'a residuary and inviolable
sovereignty,' [that] is reflected throughout the Constitution's text . . . . [T]he
Framers rejected the concept of a central government that would act upon and
through the States, and instead designed a system in which the state and federal
governments would exercise concurrent authority over the people." (citations
omitted)). See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 575-76 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) ("[FJederalism.was the unique contribution of the Framers to political
science and political theory.., it was the insight of the Framers that freedom was
enhanced by the creation of two governments.").
6.
See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552 (citing Federalist 45) (noting that the
federal government is a government defined and limited powers). In Lopez, the
Court struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, holding that the
federal government lacked the authority to pass the Act despite the government's
contention that it had such power under the Commerce Clause. Id. The Court's
reassertion of federalist principles in Lopez came two years before the decision in
Printzand was a departure from how the Court addressed the federalism principle
just eleven years before. In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,
the Court ruled that the limited powers of the Commerce Clause, allowing the
federal government to regulate commerce among states, did not prohibit the
federal government from applying federal overtime and minimum wage laws to
state and local governments. 469 U.S. 528 (1984). The Court previously had
held, in an effort to preserve federalist principles, that the federal government
could not apply such provisions against state and local governments. See
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Thus, in the period
leading up to Printz, the Court pushed some limitations on the power of the
federal government, then retreated eight years later by overturning National
League of Cities in Garcia,and finally re-embraced federalism again in Lopez.
7.
Cf. Barry Friedman, Federalism'sFuture in the Global Village, 47 VAND.
L. REV. 1441, 1442 (1994) ("As the world gets smaller, it will become more difficult
to separate the domestic and foreign spheres. Domestic regulation increasingly
has an impact on the international sphere, just as international integration has
important implications for domestic activities.").
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entered into by the federal government, make on local governments.
Part I will explain the current state of the issues addressed in the
Note, including the Vienna Convention, and the relevant provisions
relating to the arrests of foreign nationals. The Note will then
examine whether, given that international treaties have been
interpreted as providing rights and provisions that are only
enforceable by countries, a private party, such as a foreign national,
has the power to invoke the provisions in his defense when faced with

a criminal action or a habeas corpus motion. Part I will explore the
structure in the U.S. Constitution that divides powers between the
federal and state governments, granting certain powers to state
governments and imposing limits on the power of the federal
government. It is this allocation of power that may pose an obstacle
to a federal attempt to mandate state compliance with affirmative
obligations under an international treaty such as the Vienna
Convention.
The remainder of the Note will analyze the issues involved in
determining whether a foreign national can rely on a federal court to
apply the Vienna Convention against state governments to suppress
evidence. Part III will analyze whether the federal government can
impose duties on local governments through international treaties,
such as the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Vienna
Convention). Assuming that federal governments can impose these
duties on local governments, Part IV will examine whether
suppression of evidence would be a justifiable remedy for the
violation of these duties.

II. REQUIREMENTS OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION THAT A PETITIONER
MIGHT RAISE ON FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW

The Vienna Convention addresses what a member state must do
when a foreign national is arrested within its jurisdiction. United
States habeas corpus review is designed to protect individual rights
under the United States Constitution and federal law.
Before
addressing the question of whether the provisions of the Vienna
Convention can be raised on federal habeas corpus review and
whether such action would conflict with federalist principles in the
Constitution, it is important first to outline the provisions of the
Vienna Convention, the scope of federal habeas corpus review, the
question of whether treaty provisions create personal rights, and the
constitutional relationship between the powers of federal and state
governments.
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A. The Requirements of the Vienna Convention

The Vienna Convention, entered into by the United States on
November 24, 1969, was negotiated under the direction of the United
Nations International Law Commission and it binds more than one
hundred countries.8 Before the Vienna Convention, the provisions
addressing the protection of foreign nationals were contained in
bilateral treaties 9 with individual countries.1 0
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention outlines several
requirements governing the arrest of a foreign national." First, the
Vienna Convention requires that foreign nationals under arrest and
their respective consulates be allowed to communicate with one
another. 12 Second, the foreign national can require the host country
to inform his foreign consulate of the arrest.13 Third, the treaty
requires a foreign national to be informed of his right to contact his
consulate without delay. 14 Finally, consular officers can visit the
foreign national and send his communications, which are to be
delivered without delay.1 5 The obligations of the Vienna Convention
apply to all signatories.16
8.
See Victor M. Uribe, Consuls at Work UniversalInstruments of Human
Rights and ConsularProtectionin the Context of CriminalJustice, 19 Hous. J. INT'L
L. 375, 384 (1997).
9.
See id.
10.
For an example of a bilateral treaty signed after the Vienna
Convention, see Consular Relations Convention, Sept. 17, 1980, U.S.-P.R.C., art.
35 § 3, 33 U.S.T. 2973 (Treaty between the United States and China outlining
provisions that require authorities to inform foreign nationals of the other country
of their right to contact their consulate upon arrest).
11.
See Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 36, 21 U.S.T. at 100
(outlining the relevant provisions).
12.
See id.
13.
See id.

14.

See id. The foreign national in the hypothetical would allege that he

was not informed by the local government of his ability to contact and
communicate with his country's consulate.
15.

See ic

16.

See id (requiring all member countries to carry out these obligations).

This could be important in understanding the rationale behind the treaty. The
treaty not only places obligations on the United States but serves to protect
United States citizens abroad, since it binds other governments in their treatment
of American citizens. This may be an important consideration for the analysis in
this Note. If the United States government does not have the constitutional power
to bind state governments to the obligations of the treaty, then other countries
might avoid the provisions of the treaty on somewhat analogous grounds.
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B. The Role of Habeas Corpus Review in ProtectingIndividual

Rights
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a prisoner held in the custodyof a state
government can bring a writ of habeas corpus in federal court,
forcing the state to justify the prisoner's confinement. 17 To bring a
habeas corpus motion, a prisoner must allege that he is being held in
custody "in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States."1 8 If a federal court rules in favor of an individual
maling a habeas corpus motion, the court may either grant a retrial
20
on certain issues, 19 or order the release of the prisoner.
To be cognizable issues for a federal habeas corpus proceeding,
any alleged violations of federal law and treaty must be of a serious
magnitude. 2 ' In evaluating these allegations, habeas corpus reviews
typically focus on procedural defects in the trial process, particularly
in the gathering of evidence.2 2 As a result, evidence obtained in a
manner violative of a defendant's constitutional rights is excluded
from trial.2 3 The rationale behind this exclusionary rule is to enforce
24 The federal
the police's obligation to respect the rights of citizens.
courts are able to grant habeas corpus review because of the power
the federal government holds under the U.S. Constitution to enforce
Miranda v.
federal constitutional rights against the states. 25
17.
28 U.S.C. § 2254. To bring a writ of habeas corpus, the prisoner must
first exhaust all state remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b).
18.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
19.
See Fisher v. Rose, 757 F.2d 789, 791-92 (6th Cir. 1985).
20.
See Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770 (1987). The factors to consider
in deciding whether to order a release include whether the prisoner is likely to
succeed on the merits, whether the prisoner will be irreparably harmed without a

release, whether others in the proceeding will be injured, and whether a release
would serve the public interest. See id. at 776.
21.
See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41-42 (1984) (denying habeas corpus
relief when a trial error did not constitute a fundamental defect that would result
in a complete miscarriage of justice and that did not impair the rudimentary
demands of fair procedure); Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962)
(holding that prisoner's claim that a judge violated a federal rule at sentencing
was not a cognizable claim on habeas corpus because the error was not a
"fundamental defect").
22.
See Pulley, 465 U.S. at 41-42 (denying habeas corpus review when
there was no error of serious magnitude at trial).
See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914); Boyd v. United
23.
States, 116 U.S. 616, 638 (1886).
See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (holding that in
24.
the context of the Fourth Amendment, the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to
deter the government from violating a person's Fourth Amendment rights and
explaining that the exclusionary rule is not a personal right but rather a judicially
created remedy designed to safeguard rights through its deterrence effect).
25.
Federal courts have the power to enforce constitutional rights against
states because constitutional rights are generally protected against state action
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Arizona,26 which requires state and local police to inform arrested
individuals of their right to remain silent under the Fifth Amendment,

is based on the authority that federal courts have to enforce this

Thus, if the
constitutional right against local governments.2 7
rights
to
implicate
are
construed
Convention
the
Vienna
of
provisions

of a constitutional nature, federal courts may be able to use habeas
corpus review and suppression of evidence to remedy violations of the
Vienna Convention.

C. The Legal Background of the Effect of Treaties
on PersonalRights
International treaties are not presumed to create rights that are
privately enforceable. 28 Treaties generally create obligations between
countries, not between countries and individuals. 2 9

In order for

private individuals to assert rights under a treaty, the treaty clauses
30
must specifically confer such rights upon private individuals.
Thus, typically when a party incurs an injury from the failure of the
United States to follow a treaty with another country, that party
31
generally does not have standing to sue the U.S. government.
However, in cases where treaty provisions do confer private rights, an
individual may assert them.3 2 Whether the provisions do confer such
rights is determined by looking at the intent of the parties as
evidenced by the language of the treaty.3 3 A treaty conferring such
private rights is often termed a "self-executing" treaty.3
under the 14th Amendment. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968)
(holding that constitutional rights are applicable against the states when the
rights implicate fundamental principles of liberty and justice).
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
26.
See id. at 463-64 (noting that protection of rights under the United
27.
States Constitution's Fifth Amendment is applicable to the laws and actions of
states) (citing Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)).
See Goldstar v. United States, 967 F.2d 965, 968 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing
28.
Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884)).
See Committee of U.S. Citizens v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 937 (D.C. Cir.
29.
1988) (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982)).

See id.
30.
31.
See id.
32.
See id.
33.
See id.
Id. This terminology can be confusing because "self-executing" is
34.
sometimes also used to describe a treaty that does not require any implementing
legislation for it to take effect. Id.
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D. The ConstitutionalRelationship Between the Powers of the
Federaland State Governments
The federal government of the United States is a government of
limited powers that are specifically granted by the Constitution, with
all other powers left to state governments.3 5 A law passed by
Congress may be unconstitutional if it implicates a power not given to
the federal government.3 6 Thus, in an effort to define the reach of
federal power, it is necessary to first look to the language of the
Constitution..
1. The United States Constitution's Division of Powers Between the
Federal and State Governments
The specific powers of the legislative branch of the federal
government are set out in Article I, Section 8 of the U.S.
Constitution.3 7 These powers include, among others, the power to
tax, to borrow money, to regulate interstate commerce, to coin
money, to establish post offices and roads, to punish felonies
committed on the "high seas" and offenses against the law of nations,
to declare war, and to maintain a military.3 8 In addition, under
Article II, Section 2, the President of the United States has the power
to make treaties, subject to the approval of two-thirds of the United
States Senate.3 9 If a specific power is not granted to the federal
4°
government in the Constitution, that power is left to the states.
Because some powers belong to the federal government, while others
has been
are reserved to the states, the United States Constitution
41
described as creating a system of "dual sovereignty."
Such dual sovereignty results in an inherent tension between
state and federal power. That is, if the enumerated powers of the
federal government are interpreted broadly, the power of the states is
Conversely, a narrow interpretation of enumerated
diminished.
federal powers weakens federal authority. The federal court system
has been called upon repeatedly to alleviate this tension, attempting
to create a workable balance between federal and state power.

35.

See U.S. CONST. amend. X.

See also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.

549, 552 (1995).
36.
37.

38.
39.

See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.

Id.
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
40.
See U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people.").
41.
Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2376 (1997).

1006

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LA W[VoL. 31:997

During the latter part of the Great Depression, the Supreme
Court broadly interpreted the powers enumerated to the federal
government. 4 2 Recently, however, the Supreme Court has begun to
reemphasize the role of federalism inherent in the U.S. Constitution.
To this end, in the 1997 opinion of Printz v. United States, the court
explained:
Although the States surrendered many of their powers to the new
Federal Government, they retained "a residuary and inviolable
sovereignty" [that] is reflected throughout the Constitution's

text....
[T]he Framers rejected the concept of a central
government that would act upon and through the States, and
instead designed a system in which the state and federal
governments would exercise concurrent authority over the
4
people. 3

Outside of the New Deal era, the Supreme Court has struggled to
define the boundaries between the powers allocated to state
governments and those allocated to the federal government. 4 The
Supreme Court's firmest statement of federalist principles concerning
the division of power between the federal and state governments
came in the 1995 decision of United States v. Lopez. In Lopez, the
Supreme Court struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990
on the ground that the power to pass the Act did not fall into the
enumerated powers granted to the federal government in the
Constitution.45 The Supreme Court rejected the federal government's
argument that it possessed the power to pass the Act under its
Article I powers to regulate interstate commerce. 4 6 Printz discussed
more fully below, provided the Court with another opportunity to
address the division of powers between the federal and state
governments in a different context.
2. The Power of the Federal Government to Develop Law and Policy
in Foreign Relations
Unlike most of its powers, the federal government's sole
authority to engage in foreign relations with other countries does not
depend on the presence of a specific grant of such power in the
Constitution. 47 Instead, this power is derived from the fact that the

See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 554-55.
42.
43.
Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2376-77.
44.
See discussion supranote 6.
45.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
See id.
46.
47.
See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,'299 U.S. 304, 318
(1936) ("The powers to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties,
to maintain diplomatic relations with other sovereignties, if they had never been
mentioned in the Constitution, would have vested in the federal government as
necessary concomitants of nationality.").
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states in the time period preceding the Constitution were not
considered sovereign entities.48 Because they were not sovereign
entities, they could not deal in any way with foreign sovereigns.
Thus, the federal government was, and is, vested with the exclusive

power to conduct the foreign affairs of the country. The limitations

on the scope of federal power are present when a federal action
concerns the internal affairs of the country, but not when such an
action concerns foreign affairs. 4 9
Generally, when a state law and an international treaty conflict,
the international treaty overrides the state law. 50 This rule of law is
based on Article VI of the Constitution, the Supremacy Clause. 5 ' The
Supreme Court applied the Supremacy Clause in United States v.
Pink5 2 The focus in that case was an international agreement with
the Soviet Union which granted the United States rights to the funds
Despite these
of a nationalized Russian insurance company. 5 3
rights, a New York state court declined to disburse the assets of the
Russian corporation, which the state of New York possessed, to the
United States government.5 4 New York effectively did not recognize
the federal government's right to the assets under the international
agreement 5 and tried to distribute the assets to other parties in
accordance with state law.5 6 On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court

48.
See id. at 317 ("The states were not 'sovereigns' . . . . They did not
possess the peculiar features of sovereignty,--they could not make war, nor peace,
nor alliances, nor treaties . . . they could not speak to any foreign sovereign
whatever ... they could not hear any propositions from such sovereign. They had
not even the organs or faculties of defence or offence, for they could not of
themselves raise troops, or equip vessels, for war.") (quoting 5 Elliot's Debates
212).
49.
See id. at 315-16 ("The broad statement that the federal government
can exercise no powers except those specifically enumerated in the Constitution,
and such implied powers as are necessary and proper to carry into effect the
enumerated powers, is categorically true only in respect of our internal affairs.");
see also United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937) ("Governmental
power over internal affairs is distributed between the national government and
the several states. Governmental power over external affairs is not distributed,

but is vested exclusively in the national government.").
See Oneida Indian Nation v. State of New York, 691 F.2d 1070, 1088
50.
(2d Cir. 1982) (citing Curtiss-WrightExport Corp., 299 U.S. at 316-17).
51.
See U.S. CONST. art. VI ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land."); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1,16 (1957) (upholding the supremacy
of treaties over state law as long as the treaties comply with relevant provisions of
the Constitution).
52.
315 U.S. 203 (1942).
SeeicL at 211-13.
53.
54.
Seeid. at 210-11.
55.
See icL.
at 217 (The agreement in question was referred to as the Litinov
Assignment).
56.
See id.
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ruled in favor of the United States. The Court explained that New
York was refusing to recognize acts of the Soviet government that the
United States, as a matter of foreign policy, decided to recognize and

that the state's policy collided with federal policy.57 The Court held
that New York courts could not refuse to enforce the rights that the
United States possessed under federal policy, as evidenced by treaty,

international compact, or agreement.5 8
However, the Court
cautioned that "even treaties with foreign nations will be carefully
construed so as not to derogate from the authority and jurisdiction of
the States . . . unless clearly necessary to effectuate the national

policy."5 9 In this case, if New York had distributed the assets in
question in accordance with state law, it would have directly
interfered with the rights of the United States under international
60
agreement.
For a state law to be invalid under the Supremacy Clause, the
law need not directly conflict with a treaty. Even an indirect conflict
is sufficient for invalidation if the effect of the state law is to frustrate
or adversely affect a treaty provision. 6 1 This raises the question,
however, as to whether the federal government has the power to
create law in a treaty that has substantial impact on internal affairs,
while evading the usual constitutional restrictions on its law making
power.
In the 1920 case of Missouri v. Holland,6 2 the Supreme Court
implied that the restrictions on federal power only applied to acts of
Congress and not to international treaties, meaning that treaties
would automatically constitute supreme law without interference
from the normal division of powers between the federal and state
governments. 63 As the Court stated: "Acts of Congress are the
57.

See id at 23 1.

58.

See id.

59.

Id. at 230. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 143

(1938) ("Even the language of a treaty wherever reasonably possible will be
construed so as not to override state laws or to impair rights arising under
them.").
60.
See Pink, 315 U.S. at 231.
61.
See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 320 (1994)
(analyzing whether a state law impaired federal uniformity or prevented the
federal government from speaking with one voice in foreign policy, in order to
decide if the state law conflicted with federal trade policy); Zschernig v. Miller, 389
U.S. 429, 440-41 (1968) (striking down an Oregon statute regulating descent and
demise to aliens on the ground that it would impair and adversely affect the
federal government's ability to deal with foreign policy, and deciding that such a
statute interfered with constituted foreign policy favoring the passing of estate
property to individuals residing in foreign countries); Pink, 315 U.S. at 230-31
(holding that "state law must yield when it is inconsistent with, or impairs the
policy or provisions of, a treaty or of an international compact or agreement").
62.
252 U.S. 416 (1920).
63.
See Holland, 252 U.S. at 434-35.
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supreme law of the land only when made in pursuance of the

Constitution, while treaties are declared to be so when made under
the authority of the United States."64 The Holland opinion raised the
question of whether the federal government can act outside its Article
I powers via international treaty. As one commentator queried:
"Whenever Art. I powers prove insufficient to reach a local problem,
simply by
may the national government overcome that obstacle
6s
making a treaty with a cooperating foreign government?"
Holland produced fears that constitutional limitations on the
power of the federal government could be overridden by international
treaty. 6 6 In response to these fears, the Senate Judiciary Committee
proposed what became known as the Bricker Amendment to the
Constitution,6 7 which read, "[a] provision of a treaty which conflicts
with this Constitution shall not be of any force or effect." 68 However,
the Supreme Court quieted fears that it would allow intemational
treaties to circumvent the constitutional limits on the federal
government with a decision handed down in 1957.69
In that case, Reid v. Covert,70 the Supreme Court addressed
whether the federal government had the power to evade
constitutional provisions under its otherwise broad treaty-making
power. 7 1 Reid involved a military dependent tried before a military
tribunal under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, instead of in a
civilian court, for an alleged murder that took place at a U.S. military
base in England.7 2 At the time of the alleged offense, an executive
agreement existed between the United States and Great Britain that
permitted U.S. military courts to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over
criminal offenses committed in Great Britain by U.S. servicemen or
73
their dependents.
The Supreme Court ruled that the provision in the treaty
arranging for military trials of U.S. dependents could not escape the
requirements of the Constitution.7 4 In doing so, the Court rejected
the government's argument that following the requirements of the
military code was necessary and proper to carrying out the United
64.
Id. at 433. The Court also explained the qualifications to the treatymaking powers, but such qualifications would not refer to matters of national

action. See id.
65.
GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 206 (12th ed. 1991).
66.
See id.
67.
See id- Attempts to amend the Constitution in this manner repeatedly
failed during the mid-1950s. See iL

68.
69.

Id.
See icL

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

354 U.S. 1 (1957).
See . at 15-16.
See iL at 3.
See iL at 15.
See id. at 16.
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States obligations under international agreement. 75
The Court
reasoned that there was nothing in the language of the Supremacy
Clause that implied that treaties and laws enacted pursuant to these

treaties do not have to comply with the provisions of the
Constitution.7 6 As the Court explained, "no agreement with a foreign
nation can confer power on the Congress, or on any other branch of
Government, which is free from the restraints of the Constitution."7 7
The treaty powers could not be said to authorize what the
Constitution forbids or change the character of government without
the consent of the states. 78 As the Court concluded:
It would be manifestly contrary to the objectives of those who
created the Constitution . . . let alone alien to our entire
constitutional history and tradition-to construe Article IV [the
Supremacy Clause] as permitting the United States to exercise
power under an international agreement without observing
constitutional prohibitions. In effect, such construction would
permit amendment of that document in a manner not sanctioned
by Article V. 7 9

The Court pointed out that its result in Reid did not contradict the
0
holding in Holland."
The Court explained that Holland held that
the Tenth Amendment presented no bar to the federal government's
power to make a treaty since the power, to make treaties was
allocated it in Article 11.81 Reid merely clarified that while the federal
government clearly had treaty-maling powers, these powers needed
to be exercised in a manner that did not contradict other provisions
82
of the Constitution.
Thus, when a state law conflicts with international treaty, the
state law will be judged invalid with one caveat-the treaty must first
comply with the requirements of the Constitution.

75.

See id.

76.
77.

See id.
Id

78.
79.

See id. (citing Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890)).
Id. at 17.

80.

See id. at 18 ("There is nothing in State of Missouri v. Holland ...

which is contrary to the position taken here. There the Court carefully noted that
the treaty involved was not inconsistent with any specific provision of the
Constitution. The Court was concerned with the Tenth Amendment which
reserves to the States or the people all power not delegated to the National
Government.").

81.
See id.
82.
See Reid, 354 U.S. at 18 ("To the extent that the United States can
validly make treaties, the people and the States have delegated their power to the
National Government and the Tenth Amendment is no barrier.") (emphasis
added).
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3. The Power of Congress to Define and Punish Crimes Against the
Law of Nations
There is another potential avenue which may allow the federal
government to enhance its ability to comply with international
treaties, such as the Vienna Convention. In addition to its treaty

maling powers, the federal government is granted in Article I the

power to define and punish piracies and felonies on the high seas
and offenses against the "law of nations." 83 Thus far, the federal
government has not used its power to define and punish offenses
against the law of nations in defense of a treaty. The inclusion of
"offenses against the law of nations" in a clause with piracy and
felonies committed on the high seas suggests that the Constitution
gives the federal government the power to punish acts that constitute
84
crimes under an international agreement.
Although few cases address Congress' power to define and
punish offenses against the law of nations, the Supreme Court did
address the rationale of the Article I, Section 8, Clause 10 power in
the context of a case addressing the authority of the United States to
punish counterfeiting of foreign currency.8 5 In United States v.
Arijona, the Supreme Court rejected arguments that Congress did not
have the constitutional power to punish the counterfeiting of foreign
currency.8 6 The Court reasoned that the counterfeiting of currency,
which was prohibited by federal law, fell within Congress' power to
define and punish crimes against the law of nations.8 7 The Court
noted that it was international practice for countries to prohibit,
within their domain, the counterfeiting of another country's currency,
since such counterfeiting affected international commerce, which was
88
tied in an important way to domestic economies.

83.

U.S. CONST. art I, § 8.

84.
See id- ("Congress shall have Power... [t]o define and punish Piracies
and Felonies committed on the high seas, and offences against the law of
nations[.]").
85.
See United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479 (1887).
86.
Id. at 488.

87.

See id. at 484.

88.

The Court noted:

[Niational intercourse includes commercial intercourse between the people
of different nations. It is as much the duty of a nation to protect such an
intercourse as it is any other ....
[T]he amount of national and corporate
debt ... and other forms of commercial securities, which are bought and
sold in all the money markets of the world, both in and out of the country
under whose authority they were created, [are] something enormous.
Such being the case, it is easy to see that the same principles that
developed ... the rule of national conduct which was intended to prevent,
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In a passage addressing the clause specifically, the Court
commented on the justification and meaning of the clause. 8 9 The
Court pointed out that official relations between a state and a foreign0
9
nation were prevented by Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution.
Exclusive power to deal with foreign nations was left to the federal
government. 9 ' The Court further noted that, accordingly, "[tihe
national government is in this way made responsible to foreign

nations for all violations by the United States of their international
obligations, and because of this, Congress is expressly authorized to
"92
'define and punish ... offenses against the law of nations ....
The Court then explained what offenses against the law of nations
encompassed: "The law of nations requires every national government
to use 'due diligence' to prevent a wrong being done within its own
dominion to another nation with which it is at peace, or to the people
93
thereof; and because of this."
It is important to note that the above language refers to an
offense against the law of nations as more than an offense against
another country. It seems that such an offense can be directed
against the people of another country. 94 In addition to the crimes of
piracy and counterfeiting, the Court has ruled that Congress also has
95
the power to define and punish war crimes under this clause.
In a modem context, one influential court has implied that
Congress enjoys broad deference in deciding what constitutes a crime
against the law of nations. 9 6 Finzer v. Barry, a decision by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, addressed a situation
where individuals were protesting outside a foreign embassy. 97 The
protesters claimed that Congress, through use of a District of
Columbia provision, did not have the power to constitutionally
as far as might be, the counterfeiting of the money of one nation within the
dominion of another....
See id. at 485-86.
See id. at 483-84.
89.

90.

See id. at 483.

See id. at 483 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1).
Id.
Id. at 484.
See id. ("or to the people thereof..
95.
See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 7 (1946).
96.
See Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450, 1459 (D.C. Cir. 1986), rev'd in part
and aff'd in part on other grounds sub nom. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988). In
Finzer, the Court held that the wording of the District of Columbia provision
violated the First Amendment, but the Court also explained that the manner in
which it was interpreted and applied by the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia did not violate the First Amendment. The Court did not address the
power of Congress to define crimes against the Law of Nations in reaching these
dispositions.
97.
See id. at 1452.
91.
92.
93.
94.
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prohibit them from protesting within 500 feet of the foreign
98
embassy.
The court explained that the principle of protecting foreign
embassies from threats and intimidation was well-entrenched in both
the law of nations by tradition and by international treaty. 9 9 The
court then reasoned that the restrictions on the protests were
constitutional under the power of Congress to define and punish
The court discussed the
crimes against the law of nations.10
practical effect of the power to define crimes against the law of
"[A]rticle I, section 8 of the Constitution authorized
nations:
Congress to derive from the often broadly phrased principles of
international law a more precise code, as it determined that to be
necessary to bring the United States into compliance with rules
governing the international community." I0 1 When Congress has

developed such a code, the court claimed, the United States is to

enjoy deference in determining whether the code fits within its
constitutional power to define crimes against the law of nations:
When a provision is enacted in order to bring the United States into
compliance with international law, and when those obligations are
reaffirmed by treaty, a court must give careful consideration before
it sets aside that which the legislative and executive branches have
deemed necessary to fulfill the nation's international
responsibilities. 102

98.
See id.
99.
See id at 1455-58.
100. See id. at 1454-55, 1476. This result may seem to contradict the
result mandated by Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), which held that the
constitutional authority of Congress to conduct international relations could not
be used to evade other provisions of the Constitution. See supra notes 71-79 and
accompanying text. The First Amendment is a provision of the Constitution and it
may appear that Congress was using its foreign policy powers to negate a
Constitutional provision despite the holding in ReiL However, the Finzer Court
explained that the First Amendment had been interpreted by the Supreme Court
as holding that the scope of the right to demonstrate is dependent in part upon
the site of the protesting activity. See Finzer, 798 F.2d at 1462 (citing Cox. v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 562 (1965); see'also Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838
(1976); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 117 (1972) (each case
upholding the restriction of expressive activity within certain limited confines);
Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 41 (1966). The Finzer Court then explained that
the restrictions on demonstrations near embassies fell within such narrowlydefined confines, thereby avoiding a direct conflict with the First Amendment.
See Finzer, 798 F.2d at 1462 (The Statute that Congress has crafted proscribes
an opposition demonstration only within a narrowly defined locus. Plaintiffs are
free under [the statute] to hold an anti-Soviet demonstration anyvhere in the city
but within 500 feet of the Soviet Embassy .... [Tihe First Amendment does not
guarantee an optimal setting for speech . .
101. Finzer,798 F.2d at 1455.
102. Id. at 1460.
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The court did state that such deference is by no means absolute;
however, it implied that the argument for deference is strengthened
when the crime in question would adversely affect the interests of the
United States. 103
Thus, Congress may enhance its efforts to comply with
international treaties by defining certain acts as crimes against the
law of nations. The power of Congress to define and punish such
offenses is limited by whether the act "made punishable is one which
the United States are [sic] required to prevent by their international
obligations to use due diligence to prevent,"' ° or in the words of one
circuit court, whether the act is likely to "adversely affect the
interests of the United States" in foreign affairs.10 s However, the fact
that Congress has the power to define crimes against the law of
nations does not mean that Congress is constitutionally obligated to

pass legislation under this power to facilitate compliance with

treaties. 106
4. The Difference Between the Federal Government's Power to
Develop Law and Its Ability to Require Local Governments to
Administer It
As discussed above, except where limited by the Constitution,
the federal government has exclusive power to conduct foreign
relations.
However, there are some situations, such as that
presented in the hypothetical, in which internal and foreign affairs
are intertwined. The mixing of internal and external affairs presents
a unique opportunity for the federal courts to address the balance of
power between the federal and state governments.
There is also a second issue in federalism distinct from the issue
of whether the federal government has the general power to legislate
in an area. Lopez addressed a claim that the federal government
lacked authority to legislate in a certain domestic area, the
possession of guns near schools.10 7 A separate issue emerges: when

103.
See id. at 1459 ("Deference to the judgment of Congress and the
President in these matters is, of course, by no means absolute. But this is not a
case in which we are asked to believe any implausible thing. It is obvious that ill
treatment of ambassadors to the United States will adversely affect the interests
of the United States.").
104.
United States v. Aijona, 120 U.S. 479, 488 (1887).
105.
See Finzer,798 F.2d at 1459.
106.
See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889) (noting
that treaties are of no greater legal importance than statutes and that Congress
could even pass laws that would have the effect of contradicting a treaty). See

also Arjona, 120 U.S. at 488 (examining not only whether an offense is one that

Congress is required by international obligations to use due diligence to prevent,
but also whether the offense is defined in a statute).
107.
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995).
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the federal government does have the power to legislate in a certain
area-such as one involving interstate commerce-to what extent, if
at all, can it require local governments to carry the burden of
effectuating the requirements of federal law?
Printz l °8 wrestled with this very question. At issue in Printz
were the Brady Act' 0 9 amendments to The Gun Control Act of 1968.
The Gun Control Act of 1968110 provides a scheme of federal law that
governs the distribution of firearms."1

The Brady Act amendments

contain several provisions addressing background checks of
prospective firearm purchasers. Under the Brady Act, a firearms
dealer must obtain the name, address, and date of birth of an
individual wishing to purchase a firearm; verify the identity of the
buyer; and provide the identification forms to the chief law
enforcement officer (CLEO) of the buyer's residence. 1 12 The dealer
must then wait five business days before completing the sale, with
some exceptions." 3 During the five-day period, the Brady Act
requires that a CLEO must "make a reasonable effort to ascertain
within 5 business days whether receipt or possession would be in
violation of the law, including research in whatever State and local
record keeping systems are available and in a national system
designated by the Attorney General."" 4 The requirement that local
law enforcement officers carry out federal law was described by the
Supreme Court as "the forced participation of the5 States' executive in
the actual administration of a federal program.""
The Supreme Court concluded that the federal government could
not require local law enforcement officials to carry out the
background checks since the structure of the Constitution forbids the
federal government from compelling the states to enact or administer
108.

117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).

109.

The Brady Act was passed by Congress in 1993.

110.

18 U.S.C. § 921 et seq.

111. For example, The Gun Control Act of 1968 prohibits firearms dealers
from distributing handguns to certain classes of buyers, which include, among
others, convicted felons, fuigitives, and individuals who have been convicted of

domestic violence. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2368 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(d), (g)).
112. See id. at 2368-69 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(1)(A)(i)(I)-(IV)).
113. See id. at 2369 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(1)(A)(ii)). The provisions for
the five day waiting period are temporary, to be replaced with a national system
for instant background checks by November 30, 1998, as required by Pub. L.
103-159, as amended, Pub. L. 103-322. See id. at 2368. The dealer may go
ahead and sell the firearm without waiting five days if the chief law enforcement
officer (CLEO) determines that he has no reason to believe that the sale would be
illegal, or that the buyer possesses a state handgun permit that was issued after a
background check, or if the relevant state law provides for an instant background
check. See id. at 2369 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(1)(A)(ii), (C), (D)).
114. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2)).
115. Id.at2376.
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federal law. 11 6 The Court reasoned that allowing federal control of
state officers would threaten the division of power between state and
federal governments. 1 1 7 As the Court explained, "[tihe power of the
Federal Government would be augmented immeasurably if it were
able to impress into its service-and at no cost to itself-the police
118
officers of the 50 States."
The Supreme Court also reasoned that allowing Congress to
impose the burden of carrying out federal law on local officials would
also upset the separation and equilibrium of powers between the
three branches of government. The Court pointed out that the
Constitution states that the President has the duty of administering
the laws enacted by Congress and explained that the Brady Act
unconstitutionally transferred Presidential responsibility to local
government officials without "meaningful Presidential control."1 19
The Court observed that "the power of the President would be subject
to reduction, if Congress could act as effectively without the President
120
as with him, by simply requiring state officers to execute its laws."
The Court stressed that the division of power between the federal and
local governments and the division of power between the three federal
branches of government are important because they act in the
Constitution as structural protections of liberty.1 2 1 Thus, the
Supreme Court relied on the structure of the United States
Constitution, rather than the absence of enumerated powers, to hold
that the federal government could not conscript local officials into
administering federal law. 122
In analyzing the legal questions encompassed in Printz, the
Supreme Court pointed out that even when Congress has the
authority under the Constitution to pass a law, it lacks the power to
compel the states to carry out the law.123 Thus, the Court seems to
116.

"The Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or

administer a federal regulatory program'.... The mandatory obligation imposed
on CLEOs to perform background checks on prospective handgun purchasers
plainly runs afoul of that rule." Id. at 2383 (quoting New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144 (1992)).
117. See id- at 2378.
118. ICL
119. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 2-3).
120. Id
121. Seeid122. See id. Compare F'rintz, 117 S.Ct. at 2378 with id. at 2385 (Thomas,
J., concurring) (writing separately to articulate his opinion that some of the
requirements of the Brady Act are invalid under the Tenth Amendment because
they do not fall within the powers specifically enumerated to the Federal
Government).
123. Id. at 2379 (citing New York, 505 U.S. at 166). "Even where Congress
has the authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting
certain acts, it lacks the power directly to compel the States to require or prohibit
those acts .... " Id.
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be treating the question of whether the federal government has the
power to pass a law, the question addressed in Lopez, as a question
separate from whether the federal government can require a local
government to carry out the provisions of federal law. In Printz, the
federal government apparently had the power to regulate the sale of
firearms under its Constitutional power to regulate interstate
commerce.1 2 4
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court still held the
challenged Brady Act unconstitutional on different federalism
grounds-grounds that did not address the federal government's
power to regulate the subject in question, but rather its alleged power
to require local governments to actively carry out the terms of its
laws.
While a Lopez argument has merit in the domestic arena, it
would likely fail in an international context. The notion that the
federal government lacks the Constitutional authority to engage in a
specific treaty or conduct foreign policy in a certain matter lacks
validity. The Supreme Court has ruled that the federal government's
authority to make law governing international affairs does not rest on
powers enumerated in the Constitution.12 5 However, the question of
whether the federal government has the power to pass a law or
develop policy seems to be a different one from whether the federal
government can force states to carry out that policy. The broad
powers that the federal government has to engage in foreign affairs
may not be determinative of whether the federal government has the
power to compel local governments to carry the burden of
administering federal law in an international context. 126 While there
27
is case law from the Supreme Court addressing the first question,'
there is none addressing the second question with respect to foreign
affairs. Thus, it remains to be seen how a Printz argument would be
treated by the Supreme Court in an international context.

III. DOES THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT POSSESS THE POWER TO REQUIRE
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO CARRY OUT THE TERMS
OF AN INTERNATIONAL TREATY?
There are two issues to consider in determining whether the
federal government can require local government officials to carry out
the terms of the Vienna Convention.
First, does the Vienna
Convention create personal rights of a constitutional nature? If so,

124.

Id. at 2385 (Thomas, J., concurring) (criticizing the Court's position

that the sale of all firearms can be regulated by the federal government under its
Constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce).
125.
See discussion supranote 49.
126.
See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2379.
127.
See sources supranote 49.
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the federal government might be able to place an affirmative
obligation on local police to inform arrested aliens of such rights
under the power that the federal government possesses under the
128
Fourteenth Amendment, which was the justification for Miranda.
Second, if the treaty does not create personal rights of a
constitutional nature, the federal government might try to rely on its
constitutional powers to make foreign policy. However, this might be
barred due to restrictions posed by Printz on the federal
government.129
A. The Duty of Administering Provisionsof the Vienna Convention
Cannot Likely Be Forced Upon the States
Under a Miranda Framework
There are two separate points of analysis to examine in
determining whether the Vienna Convention creates personal rights
of a constitutional nature. For the federal government to place an
affirmative obligation under the Fourteenth Amendment on local
police to inform aliens of the treaty provisions, the provisions of the
treaty must not only create personal rights but such rights must be
of a constitutional nature.13 0 Thus, it is necessary to determine first,
whether the Vienna Convention creates personal rights and second,
whether these rights implicate fundamental fairness of a
constitutional proportion.
B. The Vienna Convention Has Been Generally Interpretedas Not
CreatingPersonalRights
Treaties that create personal rights are often referred to as "selfexecuting" treaties. 1 3 1 However, the term "self-executing" can be
misleading because it is also used to describe a treaty that does not
require implementing legislation before becoming effective as federal
law. 132 The term "self-executing" is used most frequently in reference
to the latter definition.13 3 In this latter sense, the Vienna Convention
is considered to be "self-executing" since the provisions of the treaty
did not require implementing legislation before becoming effective as

128.
129.
130.

See Section II.B.
See Section II.D.3.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.

131.

See Committee of U.S. Citizens v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 937(D.C. Cir.

1988); Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F. Supp. 1269, 1274 (E.D. Va. 1996)

(describing the two meanings of "self-executing" in international law).
132.
133.

See discussion supranote 34.
See Allen, 949 F. Supp. at 1274.

998]A
1EW MIRANDA

1998]

1019

federal law.' 3 4 One federal district court, in Republic of Paraguayv.
Allen, 135 addressed the issue of whether the Vienna Convention is
self-executing in the context of creating private rights that can be
enforced by individuals. The court clearly explained the difference
between two sometimes confusing definitions of self-executing and
concluded that the Vienna Convention was not "self-executing" in the
sense of creating privately enforceable rights:
The term "self-executing" has two distinct meanings in
international law ....
Most frequently, the term is used to refer to
a treaty that does not require implementing legislation before
becoming federal law ....
However, the term "self-executing" also
denotes a treaty that confers rights of action on private individuals
....

Absent such language, a private party may not seek redress

for treaty violations .... Defendants correctly note that the Vienna
13 6
Convention... [is] not "self-executing" in this sense.

The view expressed by the district court in Allen, however, that the
Vienna Convention does not create private rights of action, is
dicta. 13 7 The determination of whether the Vienna Convention
created privately enforceable rights was not determinative of the
issues before the court in Allen. The plaintiff in Allen was not a
private individual, but, instead, was a foreign country that clearly
had enforcement rights as a signing party to the Vienna
Convention. 138 Also, the district court in Allen did not cite any
authority or engage in any analysis to support its conclusion that the
Vienna Convention does not create privately enforceable rights. 139
However, treaties must expressly confer a right of standing on
private individuals to be enforceable by them. 14
To determine

134.

See United States v. Enger, 472 F. Supp. 490, 542 (D.N.J. 1978) ("The

Vienna Convention entered into force for the United States on December 13,
1972 .... Its detailed provisions, and the absence of language requiring
implementing legislation, lead me to hold that it is a self-executing treaty....
Thus, upon entry into force, it at once became operative as domestic law of the
United States."); Allen, 949 F. Supp. at 1274 (noting that the parties agreed that
the Vienna Convention was "self-executing" in the sense of not requiring
implementing legislation before taking effect as federal law).
135. Allen, 949 F. Supp. at 1274.
136. Id. at 1274.
137. See id.
138. See id. The issue of whether a private party has enforcement rights
under the Vienna Convention "has no bearing on the issues before this Court.
Paraguay is not a private individual seeking enforcement of the treaty. It is an
actual party to the contract and it has standing based on this status." IL (citing
United States v. Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214, 1232 (11th Cir. 1986) ("[U]nder
international law, it is the contracting foreign government that has the right to
complain about a violation.")).
139. See id.
140. See Committee of U.S. Citizens v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 937 (D.C. Cir.
1988). See also Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S.
428, 442 (1989) (denying relief to a private party under an international treaty
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whether private enforcement of a treaty is available, one should look
at the intent of the signing parties as evidenced by the language of
the treaty. 14 1 The language of the Vienna Convention clearly avoids
giving private parties the personal rights to enforce the provisions of
the treaty. The Preamble of the Vienna Convention states that the
treaty was not created "to benefit individuals but to ensure the
efficient performance of . . . consular posts on behalf of their
respective States." 14 2 Since the treaty was not designed to benefit
43
individuals, but rather the respective states who are signatories,'
arguing that the treaty creates individual rights would be difficult.
Furthermore, the language of the treaty not only indicates a
disposition against personal rights, but also fails to include any
specific provisions allowing private enforcement. 144
However, one Federal Court of Appeals may have implied that
the Vienna Convention creates personal rights that are privately
enforceable. 145 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, addressing a
situation in which an arrested alien was not advised of his ability to
contact his foreign consulate, referred to the alien's ability to contact
his consulate as "his rights under the Convention." 14 6 Although the
court did not state that the Convention created personal rights, it did
seem to treat the rights as being privately enforceable as the
arguments pertaining to the Vienna Convention were brought to the
court by the criminal defendant in his individual capacity.' 47 In
responding to the defendant's arguments, the court did not state that
the defendant did not have the ability to present the claims; rather, it
when the treaty merely set "substantive rules of conduct" and stated that
compensation shall be paid for certain wrongs); supra Section II (C).
See Committee of U.S. Citizens, 859 F.2d at 937. See also Allen, 949 F.
141.
Supp. at 1274 (stating that absent language in a treaty conferring rights of action
on private parties, a private party may not seek redress for treaty violations).
142. Vienna Convention, supranote 2, pmbl., 21 U.S.T. at 79.
143. See discussion supranote 2.
144. See generally supra note 2 (failing to include provisions in the treaty
allowing private enforcement). One United States Court of Appeals has allowed
private enforcement of alien rights. See United States v. Rangel-Gonzales, 617
F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Calderon-Medina, 591 F.2d 529 (9th
Cir. 1979). However, these private enforcements were not based on the Vienna
Convention but rather on federal regulations governing Immigration and

Naturalization Services proceedings that were issued to comply with the Vienna
Convention.

See Rangel-Gonzales at 530.

The Court, however, made the

determination that the regulations, which are separate from the treaty, were
issued principally to benefit the alien. See ic
145. See Faulder v. Johnson, 81 F.3d 515, 520 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 117

S. Ct. 487 (1996).
146. Id.
147. See id. at 517 ("Faulder ...

seeks relief from the federal courts...

Faulder claims he is entitled to relief because... Faulder's right to compulsory
and due process was violated when law enforcement officials violated the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations.").
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dismissed the claims on other grounds 14 8 which will be discussed in
Section IV. It is worth noting, however, that since the claims were
readily dismissable on other grounds, 14 9 the court may have felt that
it was unnecessary to examine whether the rights were privately
enforceable.
The language of the Convention suggests that the provisions of
the treaty do not create personal rights that are privately
enforceable. 1 5 0 There is also some precedent implying that the treaty
does not create personal rights that are privately enforceable, as seen
5
in Paraguay.1
' However, the treatment of these treaty provisions in
1 52
federal courts has not been entirely clear.
For example, recently the United States Supreme Court
addressed this issue in a high-profile case involving a foreign national
of Paraguay who attempted to suppress a confession that he had
given in connection with his 1993 murder conviction, on the ground
that he had not been informed of the Vienna Convention
provisions."5 3 The Court did not directly address whether the foreign
national could use the Vienna Convention to attack and suppress his

confession, explaining that his claims did not need to be addressed

on their merits because they were procedurally barred.' 5 4 However,
the Court did comment directly on the issue of whether the Vienna
Convention created individual rights, by referencing the treaty as
follows: "[Tihe Vienna Convention-which arguably confers on an
15 5
individual the right to consular assistance following arrest."

The federal courts have followed the general rule that treaties are
not presumed to create privately enforceable rights.' 5 6 Even in a

See id. at 520 ("While we in no way approve of Texas' failure to advise
148.
Faulder, the evidence that would have been obtained by the Canadian authorities
is merely the same as or cumulative of evidence defense counsel had or could
have obtained.... The violation, therefore, does not merit reversal.").
149.
See id.
150.
See Vienna Convention supra note 2, pmbl., 21 U.S.T. at 79 (stating
that the purpose of the provisions is not to benefit individuals).
151.
See Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F. Supp. 1269, 1274 (E.D. Va.
1996).
152.
See Faulder,81 F.3d at 520 (entertaining a claim of a violation of the
Convention without discussing the issue of standing); United States v. EsparzaPonce, 1998 WL 258432 at *12-13 (S.D. Cal. May 18, 1998) (describing the
question of whether the Vienna Convention confers personal rights as a murky
one and declining to answer it).
153.
See Breard v. Greene, 118 S. Ct. 1352 (1998).
154.
See id at 1355.
155.
Id- (emphasis added). The Clinton Administration in the Breard case
took the view that the treaty did not create personal rights and was a matter for
country-to-country diplomacy. Linda Greenhouse, Court Weighs Execution of
Foreigner,N.Y. TIMEs, April 14, 1998, at A14.
156.
See Goldstar v. United States, 967 F.2d 965, 968 ( 4th Cir. 1992)
(citing Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99(1884)); Argentine Republic v.
Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 442 (1989).
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context that deals with the rights of criminals under foreign treaty,
the courts have declined to view such rights as privately
enforceable.' 5 7 In cases where an individual was extradited from a
foreign country and claimed violations of the United States'
obligations under the relevant extradition treaty, courts have
generally held that an individual does not have standing to raise
violations of that treaty in his defense, unless the extraditing country
158
formally objects to the treaty violation.
An extraditing country has the right to object to the violations of
the extraditing treaty. However, an extraditing country is held l5to
9
have waived its right by failing to object to the treaty violation.
Such a waiver creates a situation where an individual cannot raise
the violations of the treaty. 160 Because the individual cannot raise
the violations of an extradition treaty herself, it appears that any
provisions that a defendant could use in his defense are not
enforceable as private rights. Raising the violations would require
16 1 It
the involvement of the signing country to the extradition treaty.
is important to note that, in this context, a defendant cannot by
herself raise violations of an extradition in his defense even if the
62
provisions would otherwise appear to grant his personal rights.'
To interpret the Vienna Convention as granting personal rights
would run against the presumption that international treaties do not
create such rights.' 6 3 It also seems contrary to the language of the
treaty, which indicates that the purpose of the Vienna Convention
was to aid relations between countries and not to benefit
individuals. 16 4 Furthermore, it would break with the manner in
which violations of international treaties usually are treated in
157.
158.

See United States v. Puentes, 50 F.3d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 1995).
See id ("The extradited individual, however, enjoys this right [to object

to violation of an extradition treaty] at the sufferance of the requested nation. As
a sovereign, the requesting nation may waive its right to object to a treaty
violation and thereby deny the defendant standing to object to such an action.")
(citing United States v. Riviere, 924 F.2d 1289, 1300-01 (3d Cir. 1991); United
States v. Najohn, 785 F.2d 1420, 1422 (9th Cir. 1986)). Cf. United States v.
Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 665 (1992) (holding that abductions conducted
outside the scope of an extradition treaty do not necessarily constitute violations
of such a treaty). But see United States v. Cuevas, 847 F.2d 1417, 1426 (9th Cir.
1988) (holding that an individual may assert the objections to an extraditing
treaty that the extraditing country would be entitled to raise).
159. See Puentes, 50 F.3d at 1575.
160. See id
161.

See icL

162. See id. at 1571, 1576 (rejecting a defendant's attempt to raise a
provision in an extradition treaty with Uruguay that mandates that a person can
be tried only for the offense extradited).
163. See Goldstar v. United States, 967 F.2d 965, 968 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing

Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884)).
164.

See Vienna Convention, supranote 2, pmbl., 21 U.S.T. at 79.
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criminal trials. 165
However, at least one United States Court of
Appeals did not object when a criminal defendant personally raised
violations of the Vienna Convention on a federal habeas corpus

motion.166
Even if an individual criminal defendant can raise provisions of
the Vienna Convention in his defense as personal rights, this alone is
not enough to justify placing an obligation on local police to inform
aliens of their rights under a Miranda framework. The Miranda
rationale can be justified on the grounds that the federal government
has the constitutional power to impose such an affirmative duty on
local police under the Fourteenth Amendment because of the
constitutional nature of Miranda rights. 167 A determination of
whether the federal government can impose an affirmative duty on
states to carry out the provisions of the Vienna Convention requires
analyzing whether any personal rights that might be present in the
Vienna Convention are of constitutional magnitude.
C. The Vienna Convention Does Not Likely Implicate
ConstitutionalRights
One recent United States Court of Appeals explicitly addressed
whether the provisions of the Vienna Convention implicated
constitutional rights.
The Fourth Circuit, in Muiphy v.
Netherland,16 8 held that a violation of the Vienna Convention is not
the equivalent of a denial of a constitutional right:
[E]ven if the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations could be
said to create individual rights (as opposed to setting out the rights
and obligations of signatory nations), it certainly does not create
constitutionalrights. Although states may have an obligation under
the Supremacy Clause to comply with the provisions of the Vienna
Convention, the Supremacy Clause does not convert violations of
treaty provisions (regardless whether those provisions can be said
to create individual rights) into violations of constitutional rights.
Just as a state does not violate a constitutional right merely by
violating a federal statute, it does not violate a constitutional right
16 9
merely by violating a treaty.

In Faulder,the defendant had asserted a constitutionally-based
argument that the failure of local police to inform him of his "rights"

165.
See United States v. Puentes, 50 F.3d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 1995).
166.
See Faulder v. Johnson, 81 F.3d 515, 520 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 117
S. Ct. 487 (1996) (allowing a criminal defendant to raise the claim that his rights
were violated when law enforcement officials failed to advise him of his rights
under the Vienna Convention).
167.
See supra text accompanying note 27.
168. 116 F.3d 97, 99-100 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 118 S. Ct. 26 (1997).
169.
Id. at 100.
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under the Vienna Convention violated his right to due process. 170
The Fifth Circuit did not discuss the due process aspects of the
defendant's argument. Rather, the court dismissed the defendant's
Vienna Convention arguments on the grounds that the defendant
could not show that he was prejudiced by the police failure to inform
him of the relevant Vienna Convention provisions. 17 1 However, the
Fifth Circuit's focus on prejudice indicates that any rights that may
exist under the treaty do not rise to the level of being constitutional.
A showing of prejudice is not required to suppress evidence that is
gained in violation of constitutional rights, such as those conferred
by Miranda. In Murphy, the Fourth Circuit did not address the
defendant's constitutional argument that the Vienna Convention
provisions impacted his constitutional rights. 172
However, even if a defendant argues that the failure of police to

inform his of "rights" under the Vienna Convention infringes on due
process or fundamental fairness, as guaranteed by the Constitution,
that argument is unlikely to succeed. The Second Circuit has
squarely addressed the issue of whether the failure to inform an
arrested alien of his ability to contact his consulate undermined his
fundamental liberties. The court in Waldron v. 1NS 17 3 held that it
did not, explaining that the failure of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) to inform the defendant of the Vienna
Convention, as required by an INS regulation, did not constitute a
violation of fundamental liberties with constitutional origins.17 4 The
Waldron court took care to distinguish its decision from another
Second Circuit case, Montilla v. fTN,1 75 where a deportation
proceeding was invalidated because of the INS' failure to abide by an
INS regulation requiring a defendant to be informed of his right to
counsel.17 6
170.
171.

Faulder,81 F.3d at 517.
See id. at 520:

The district court correctly concluded that Faulder or Faulder's attorney
had access to all of the information that could have been obtained by the
Canadian government. While we in no way approve of Texas' failure to
advise Faulder, the evidence that would have been obtained by the
Canadian authorities is merely the same as or cumulative of evidence
defense counsel had or could have obtained .... The violation, therefore,
does not merit reversal.
172. Murphy, 116 F.3d at 99-100 (stating that the defendant merely claimed
that his conviction and resulting death sentence were constitutionally invalid
because of the failure of local police to inform him that he had a right under the
Vienna Convention to contact his consulate).
173. 17 F.3d 511 (2d Cir. 1993).

174.

See id.at 518.

175.

926 F.2d 162 (2d Cir. 1991).

176.

See Waidron, 17 F.3d at 517.
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Thus, at least one circuit appears reluctant to use "due process"
under the Fourteenth Amendment to expand constitutional
protections beyond those specifically enumerated in the Constitution
to cover violations of the Vienna Convention. A judicial posture that
holds that a criminal defendant can receive due process even though
provisions of the Vienna Convention concerning his arrest are
violated presumably views any rights that a defendant may have
under the treaty as special rights, not as fundamental fights of
constitutional importance. 177 Such a posture may make sense,
considering that the Vienna Convention would create "rights" for
aliens above and beyond the constitutional safeguards afforded to
citizens.
While an alien may have personal rights under a treaty, the
courts seem to hold that these rights do not implicate rights
guaranteed on a constitutional level. 178
Miranda requires that
arrested aliens be informed of their right to remain silent and their
right to counsel,' 7 9 and courts apparently feel that following this
duty meets what is required by the Constitution.18 0 Any rights

derived from the Vienna Convention that are violated by local officials
are not violations of constitutional rights but rather rise only to the
level of statutory rights that one may have under federal law.' 8 ' Nor
the do the rights that an alien may have under the Vienna
82
Convention have any constitutional origins.1
In sum, the position that the Vienna Convention creates
personal rights is untenable considering the language in the
preamble of the treaty 8 3 and the treatment that the treaty has
received thus far in case law. l 8 4 In addition, no circuit court has
held that the protections of the Vienna Convention must be followed
for a criminal defendant to have due process under the

177.
See id. (holding that a right under the Vienna Convention allowing an
alien to communicate with his consulate is not a fundamental, constitutional

right).
178.
See Murphy, 116 F.3d at 99-100; Waldron, 17 F.3d at 517.
179.
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 at 463-64 (1966).
180.
Compare Waldron, 17 F.3d at 517-18 (declining to invalidate a
deportation proceeding even though the defendant-alien was not informed of his
ability to communicate with his consulate) with Montilla, 926 F.2d at 169
(invalidating a deportation proceeding when a defendant-alien was not informed
of his right to communicate with legal counsel, a constitutional right under the
Fifth Amendment).
181.
See United States v. Esparza-Ponce, 1998 WL 258432 at *14 (S.D. Cal.

May 18, 1998) ("The Court holds that a violation of the Convention does not rise
to the level of a Miranda violation."); Murphy v. Netherland, 116 F.3d 97, 99-100
(4th Cir.) cert. denied 118 S. Ct. 26 (1997).
182.
See Waldron, 17 F.3d at 518.

183.
184.

See Vienna Convention supranote 2, pmbl., 21 U.S.T. 79.
See supraPart Ill.A. 1.
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Constitution.1 8s Because the courts are hesitant to hold that the
Vienna Convention creates personal rights, and even more hesitant to
attach constitutional due process importance to any such rights,
reliance on a Miranda framework to impose the duty of informing
aliens of their "rights" under the Vienna Convention would likely fail.
If the federal government were to affirmatively require local
government officials to carry out the provisions of the Vienna
Convention, it would probably have to rely on its constitutional power
to conduct foreign policy and make treaties. The conflict between the
limitations on the ability of the states to contradict foreign policy and
the limitations on the power of the federal government posed by
Printzmerits analysis.
D. It is Not Clearthat the Federal Government Can Force the
AdministrativeDuties of InternationalTreaties
on State Governments
There seems to be a tension in the Constitution between the
ability of the federal government to formulate coherent national policy
in the areas that it is entitled to do so under the Constitution, and
the power of states to formulate their own policy and maintain a
degree of independence from the federal government.18 6 The federal
government does have broad treaty-making powers and the case law
is clear that the state governments cannot effectively contradict
international treaty through state law. The interesting question is: to
what degree can the federal government avoid constitutional limits on
its power to act in internal affairs by placing new duties on states via
international treaty?
If state law conflicts with an international treaty in a direct
sense, the state law or practice is likely to be struck down by a
federal court. However, current federal law does not address the
degree to which a state must engage in affirmative acts to effectuate
the policy or provisions of an international treaty. The first part of
this section will address the conflict between state arrest practices
and treaty law and whether any such conflict could justify the federal
government imposing affirnative duties on states. The second part
will address whether the distribution of power between the three
branches of government in the Constitution would forbid the
imposition of such affirmative duties. Lastly, this section will analyze
the effect of the federal government's Article I powers to define and
185. See Murphy, 116 F.3d at 99-100 (holding that violations of the Vienna
Convention do not constitute constitutional violations); Waldron, 17 F.3d at 518
(holding that any rights under the Vienna Convention do not implicate

fundamental rights with constitutional origins).
186. See Friedman, supranote 7, at 1471-72.
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punish offenses against the law of nations and the ability of the
federal government to regulate state government actions regarding
practices covered in an international treaty.
1. It Is Questionable Whether There Is a Conflict Between State
Arrest Practices and the Vienna Convention Requirements that
Would Justify Voiding State Arrest Practices
If a state law or practice conflicts with the terms of a valid treaty,
that law or practice is void under the Supremacy Clause.1 8 7 It is
clear that there is no direct conflict with international law when a

state government arrests aliens without informing them of provisions
in the Vienna Convention that give them the right to contact their
consulate. The United States is still free to carry out its obligations
under the Vienna Convention by informing the aliens of their ability
to contact their foreign consulates. 188 An example of a direct conflict
is if a local government fails to inform an alien of his right to
communicate with his consulate, or prevents the alien from
exercising this right. Such a policy or state law would directly
conflict with the provisions of international law as determined by
federal law,' 8 9 and such local practice or law would be void under the
Supremacy Clause. 190 However, the absence of a direct conflict with
federal treaty law does not mean that a state practice or law is valid
under the Supremacy Clause. 19 1
Even in the absence of a direct conflict with a treaty provision, if
a state practice or law impedes the policy behind a federal treaty
provision, it will be void under the Supremacy Clause.19 2 The United
States would likely find out that a foreign national is arrested before
he goes to trial. 19
The federal government could, at that time,
inform his of the relevant Vienna Convention provisions in
accordance with Vienna Convention requirements. 194
Arguably,
however, relying on the federal government to inform foreign
nationals of the treaty provisions would cause too much delay. Thus,
it may be useful to uncover the policy behind the relevant Vienna

187.

See supranotes 50-51 and accompanying text.

188. See Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 36, 21 U.S.T. at 100
(requiring a foreign national to be informed of his ability to contact his consulate).
189.

See id. (requiring that a foreign national be able to freely communicate

with his consulate).
190. See supratext accompanying note 51.
191. See supranote 61 and accompanying text.
192. See id. Assuming, of course, that the treaty provision conforms with
the requirements of the Constitution. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 1, 6 (1957).
193.
Criminal proceedings are generally a matter of public record and the
federal government could do a search of such records to facilitate any efforts that
it might undertake in bringing the matter of an alien arrest to its attention.
194.
See Vienna Convention supra note 2, art. 36, 21 U.S.T. at 100.
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Convention provisions to determine whether failing to inform aliens of
their "rights" under the treaty upon arrest would conflict with this
policy. Once the policy is known, it will be easier to consider the
relevance of the timing of notification.
In determining the policy behind the relevant Vienna Convention
provisions, it may be useful to refer to the somewhat similar policies
behind the Miranda decision. Miranda,like the Vienna Convention,
deals with rights that an arrested individual must be informed of
while in custody. 19 5 The policy behind the Mirandarequirements is
to ensure the protection of the rights that an individual in custody
has under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.1 9 6 In order to
effectuate protections for an individual's right to remain silent, 197 the
policies of the Mirandarule dictate that an individual in custody be
informed of such rights prior to questioning. 198 To inform an
individual in custody of his rights after questioning would greatly
undermine the policy of protecting the individual's Fifth Amendment
rights. 199

The policy of the Vienna Convention as a whole is "to ensure the
efficient performance of . . .

consular posts on behalf of their

respective States."20 0
The drafters of the Vienna Convention
apparently thought, as evidenced by Article 32 of the Convention,
that for consulars to act efficiently, it was necessary for such
consulars to have the opportunity to consult with arrested foreign
nationals. 2 0 1 One might argue that it is important that the consulars
be contacted immediately so as to inform aliens of their relevant
constitutional rights. 2 °2
However, aliens already receive such
notification of their rights as part of their Mirandawarnings. 20 3 Also,
an argument could be made that since aliens are presumably less
familiar with the legal system in this country, it is necessary for
someone of their own country to explain the importance of any
constitutional right that they may waive. However, Miranda is
sufficient to provide this type of protection. Mirandaholds that any
195. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 436-37 (1966).
196. See id. at 444 ("As for the procedural safeguards to be employed ....
Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain
silent.., and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the

waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.").
197. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person... shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself .
").
198. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 ("Prior to any questioning, the person
must be warned that he has a right to remain silent...

199.

See id.

200.

See Vienna Convention, supranote 2, pmbl., 21 U.S.T. at 79.

201.
202.

See id. art. 36, 21 U.S.T. at 100.
See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
See Miranda,384 U.S. at 444.

203.

98]A
NEW MIRANDA

19981

1029

waiver of constitutional rights must be done not only voluntarily, but
"knowingly and intelligently" as well.20 4 Thus, if a consulate makes
contact with an arrested alien of his country after questioning, it is
hard to see how the alien is prejudiced, since Miranda lays down
broad, sweeping protections that all individuals in custody enjoy.
Regardless, the policy of the Vienna Convention seems to be
focused on something other than the protection of individual rights.
The Preamble of the Vienna Convention holds that the treaty was not
created "to benefit individuals."20 5 Such an attitude is reflected in
regulations issued by the U.S. Department of Justice to effectuate
compliance with Vienna Convention provisions.2 0 6 Such regulations
require federal officers to inform an arrested alien that his consulate
will be notified of the arrest. 20 7 However, the regulation does not
require federal officers to inform an arrested alien of his right to
communicate with the consulate, 208 evidencing a focus away from
the individual and toward the relevant foreign government. Thus,
both the preamble of the Vienna Convention, and the regulations
issued by the federal government to comply with the treaty, suggest
that the policy behind the Vienna Convention provisions is not one of
safeguarding individual rights.
Faulderindicates that the policy of the Vienna Convention is to
allow countriesan opportunity to assist in the defense of one of their
citizens before trial. 20 9 In Faulder, the Fifth Circuit refused to
overturn state criminal proceedings, explaining that the evidence that
could have been obtained by an alien's home country in preparation
for trial would have had no effect on the trial process because it
would have been duplicative of evidence that his domestic defense
had gathered. 2 10 The court did not apply the Vienna Convention to
the defendant's due process claim that his personal rights were
violated.2 11 The approach adopted by the Fifth Circuit is consistent
with the Vienna Convention's policy of providing an opportunity for
countries to participate in foreign processes involving their citizens,
as opposed to a focus centered on granting individual rights.
Thus, the policy goals of the Vienna Convention seem not to
require that an alien be informed of the relevant provisions as quickly
as he would be informed of his Miranda rights. Miranda concerns
personal, constitutional rights and requires that an alien be informed

204.

Id.

205.

Vienna Convention, supranote 2, pmbl., 21 U.S.T. at 79.

206.

See 28 C.F.R. 50.5 (1997).

207.
208.
209.

See id.
See id.
See Faulder v. Johnson, 81 F.3d 515, 520 (5th Cir.) cert. denied 117 S.

Ct. 487 (1996).
210. Id.
211. See id.
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of his constitutional rights at least before questioning, since the
rights include the right to remain silent.2 12 The Vienna Convention
concerns the rights of nations and is designed to give a country the
opportunity to represent itself at the alien's trial, which comes later
2 13
in the criminal process.
However, there is a compelling counterargument. A delay would
have a negative effect on the efficiency of foreign consulars. The
efficiency of consular posts is a concern expressed in the preamble of
the Vienna Convention for the treaty's creation. 2 14 Thus, this delay
might pose a conflict. This argument is strengthened by another
provision of the Vienna Convention, which holds that an alien is
required to be infonned of his ability to contact the relevant foreign
consulate without delay. 2 15 However, the state governments are not
prohibiting the federal government from fulfilling its role under the
treaty. Furthermore, state governments would likely argue that they
are under no obligation to help the federal government administer its
duties, and that any failure of the federal government to comply with
Vienna Convention provisions would result from the federal
government's laxity in finding out about arrests of aliens. 2 16 The
state practices would not necessarily counter federal practices,
though they could possibly be supplemented by federal practices to
effectuate effective compliance with the treaty. 2 17 However, the fact
that the treaty requires notification without delay implies that there
are some important policy implications that would be undermined by
any delay. The answer to this legal quandary may lie in a court's
determination of how quickly the federal government could notify an
alien of Vienna Convention provisions in the absence of the state
compliance.
2. Even If a Conflict Exists, Imposing Affirmative Duties on Local
Officials Might Not Be Constitutional Because of the Separation of
Powers Doctrine
When the federal government imposes affirmative duties on local
governments to effectuate federal law, there is another constitutional
issue that arises, besides the division of power between local and

212. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) ("Prior to any
questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent...").
213. See Vienna Convention, supranote 2, pmbl., 21 U.S.T. at 79; Faulder,
81 F.3d at 520.
214. See Vienna Convention, supra note 2, pmbl., 21 U.S.T. at 79 (stating
that "the purpose of such privileges... is... to ensure the efficient performance
of... consular posts...").

215. See id. art. 36 (1)(c), 21 U.S.T. at 101.
216. Perhaps the federal government could efficiently meets its obligations
by creating a federal reporting system for arrests of aliens.
217. See id. art. 36, 21 U.S.T. at 100-01.
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federal government.2 18 The federal government cannot transfer the
duties of enforcing federal law from the Executive Branch to local
governments. Doing so, in the opinion of the Supreme Court, as
evidenced by Printz, would upset the constitutionally structured
2 19
division of power between the three branches of government.
Thus, determining whether the federal government can void state
arrest procedures, despite the traditional division of power between
federal and state governments, would be determinative of whether the
federal government can impose the obligations of effectuating treaty
provisions on local governments.
Imposing the burdens of carrying out federal treaty law2 20 on
state governments would clearly violate the division of power between
the three branches of the federal government. 2 2 1 This would likely be
the effect even if imposing the duties of the Vienna Convention on
state governments was judged to be consistent with the division of
Placing the
power between federal and state governments. 22 2
instead of
on
states
law
federal
effectuating
administrative burden of
the executive branch would dilute the power of the executive branch,
allowing Congress or the courts to bypass the role of the executive in
administering federal law by placing that role on state
governments. 22 3 This is precisely what the Supreme Court criticized
in Printz.
The federal government's traditional powers would not override
the separation of powers concerns expressed in Printz. It is

important to note that Miranda addresses constitutional law,
through which the federal government can impose on the states
constitutional duties under the Fourteenth Amendment. 22 4 This is
why the determination of whether any "rights" under the Vienna

218.
219.

See Printzv. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2378 (1997).
See idLSee also supraPart II.D.3.

220. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889)
(referring to treaty law as "law of the United States" and according it the same
status as statutes passed by Congress). See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1
(forbidding state treaties as a matter of law); U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (granting
Congress the power to make treaties); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).
See supratext accompanying notes 117-19.
221.

222. See id.
223. See Printz, 117 S.Ct. at 2378 (citing U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 3). Even if
one were to argue that the division of power between the federal and state
governments relied solely on the Tenth Amendment, and that this Amendment,
because of Holland, was inapplicable to foreign policy, it is important, as noted in

Section II.D.3 of this Note, that the Court in Printz did not rely on the Tenth
Amendment. Instead, the Court relied on the structure of the Constitution as a
whole in addressing the division of power between the branches of government
and the division of power between the federal and local governments. See id.
224. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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Convention would rise to a constitutional nature22 5 may have
important implications. One may try to argue that the Necessary and
Proper Clause in Article II, Section 8 would give Congress the power
to impose affirmative duties on state governments, when necessary,
to carry out an international treaty.2 2 6 However, the Supreme Court
in Printz firmly rejected the idea that the Necessary and Proper
Clause could be used to impose affirmative obligations on states. As
explained by the Court, "[e]ven where Congress has the authority
under the Constitution to pass laws requiring .. . certain acts, it
lacks the power directly to compel the States to require . . .those
227
acts."
3. Congress Might Have the Ability to Impose Duties on Local
Governments Under Its Power to Define and Punish Crimes Against
the Law of Nations
Since Congress has the power under Article I, Section 8, Clause
10, to define and punish crimes against the law of nations, Congress
might be able to pass federal legislation expanding on the Vienna
Convention.
Congress can derive from broad principles of
international law a more precise federal code, if such a code is
necessary "to bring the United States into compliance with rules
governing the international community."2 28 The Supreme Court has

ruled that the law of nations holds that every national government
should use "due diligence" to prevent wrongs being done in its own
territory against another country or citizens of that country.2 2 9 This
suggests that Congress could distill from the Vienna Convention
precise code provisions regulating the arrest of foreign nationals.
The above reasoning may be problematic. First, if the Vienna
Convention does not create personal rights, and the analysis and
case law in Section III (A) suggest that it does not,230 it may be
difficult to argue that arresting an alien without informing him of the
relevant Vienna Convention provisions is a wrong that the federal

225.
See supra Section III.A.2.
226. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 18 ("The Congress shall have Power...
To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution
the foregoing Powers and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States...").
227. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2379 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144, 166 (1992)).
228. Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450, 1455 (D.C. Cir. 1986), rev'd in part and
aff'd onpart on othergrounds sub non Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
229. United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479, 488 (1887).
230.
See supraSection III.A.
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23 l
government would be justified in preventing by federal law.
However, in Finzer, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia held that the legislative and executive branches of the

federal government are to be given deference when they deem that a
provision under Congress' power to define and punish crimes against
the law of nations is necessary to bring the United States into
compliance with international law. 23 2 This discretion indicates that
the courts are reluctant to second-guess Congress' judgment that
such a law is necessary to prevent a wrong done to citizens of foreign
23 3
countries.
Defining arrests of aliens not advised of Vienna Convention
provisions as crimes would present an even greater conflict with
Printz. Normally, criminal law prohibits negative acts, as has been
seen in examples where Congress has used its Clause Eight power to
define and punish crimes against the law of nations, such as
counterfeiting. 23 4 Criminal law does not normally require one to
engage in affirmative acts. Nevertheless, if Congress legislated that
local governments must inform aliens of Vienna Convention
provisions upon being arrested, with the failure to do so constituting
a crime, it would be using federal criminal law to impose affirmative
duties on local governments.
At first glance, this might conflict with Printz.23 5 Printzs holding
regarding the division of power between federal and local
governments 23 6 may or may not be applicable here. The power of
Congress to define and punish crimes against the law of nations does
not expressly exclude state governments from exercising this
power. 23 7 If Congress could, under its broad discretion in Article I,
Section 8, Clause 10,238 define what actions on the part of states
constitute crimes against the law of nations, then Congress would, in
effect, have the power to void state practices under the Supremacy
23 9
Clause that are not in conflict with an international treaty.

231.
See Arijona, 120 U.S. at 484 (noting that a national government can use
due diligence to prevent a "wrong being done within its territory against a foreign

country or citizens of that country).
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Finzer,798 F.2d at 1460.
See id.
See Ajona, 120 U.S. 479.
See supra Section II.D.3.
See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2378 (1997).
See U.S. CONsT. art I, § 8, cl. 10 ("The Congress shall have Power...

To define and punish ... Offenses against the Law of Nations.").
238.

See Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450, 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (noting, in a

case addressing the use of Congress' powers under Article I, Section 8, Clause
Ten, that when the federal government passes a law designed to bring the United

States into compliance with international law, broad deference is to given to the
legislative and executive branches), rev'd in part and afjfd inpart on other grounds
sub nom. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
239.
See supraSection III.B.2.
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When analyzing whether a state practice constitutes a conflict
with international treaty under the Supremacy Clause, a court must
determine whether a conflict actually exists with an international
treaty.2 40 However, the application of Article I, Section 8, Clause 10
to state governments would essentially allow Congress to make this
determination.2 4 1 Congress would be able to expand treaty law via
federal code to the point where there was a conflict between state
practices and an international law, even if there was no conflict with
the express provisions of a treaty itself.24 2 Then it would be able to
determine, in its sole discretion, whether a state practice contradicted
international law. 2 4 3

This would seemingly remove the role of the

courts in mediating such a conflict.
Thus, there may be constitutional dangers to the separation of
federal and state governments in allowing Congress to apply this
clause against state governments. The application of Article I,

Section 8, Clause 10 against states would give federal law a broader
power to override state law without meeting the conflict test used by
the courts in determining whether a state law must yield to an
international treaty under the Supremacy Clause. 2 44 In the case of
the Vienna Convention, the federal government would be using its
power to define crimes against the law of nations to punish the
absence of affirmative acts by states, which might heighten the
concerns expressed in Printz.2 4 5 The resolution of the conflict here
would depend on whether the power of Congress under a specific
provision of the Constitution is judged to outweigh the Constitution's
structural devices for protecting the balance of power between the
federal government and the states.
Of course, it is possible that a court could decide that the power
of Congress to define crimes against the law of nations was not
intended to be applied against the actions of states in an effort to
resolve conflicts between state practices and international treaty.
The court could reason that the Supremacy Clause, instead, was
designed to appropriately resolve federal and state conflicts. 24 6 A
240.
See supraSection ll.D.2.
241.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
242.
See Finzer,798 F.2d at 1455 ("[A]rticle I, section 8 of the Constitution
authorized Congress to derive from the often broadly phrased principles of
international law a more precise code ....
).

243. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (giving Congress the power to define
offenses); Finzer, 798 F.2d at 1455 (noting that Congress determines under
Article I, Section 8 whether maling a certain act illegal is necessary to bring the
United States into conformance with international rules of conduct).
244
See supra Section III.B.2.

245.

See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2378 (1997).

246.
See supra Section III.B.2 (analyzing how courts use the Supremacy
Clause in determining whether a federal law overrides state law in the context of
international treaties).
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court might come to such a conclusion in attempting to interpret
Article I, Section 8, Clause 10 in a manner consistent with the
Constitution's structural division of power between the federal and
state governments and between the branches of the federal
government itself.
Printz's concern about the balance of power between the
branches of the federal government would also be relevant to this
situation. 2 47 If Congress used its power to define crimes against the
law of nations as a way of imposing on states the duties of
administering international law, this would weaken the power of the
executive branch in administering federal law. Reducing the role of
the President in administering federal law would unconstitutionally
2 48
undermine the division of power between the three branches.
A second concern about the separation of powers would arise if

Congress used its power to define offenses against the law of nations
against the actions of state governments. Normally, the federal
judiciary determines whether state actions or laws undermine federal
law. 24 9 However, if Article I, Section 8, Clause 10 is applied against
the states, then Congress would, as discussed above, have the sole
power to determine whether restricting a state action was necessary
to conform to international law. Thus, the role of an independent
judiciary in evaluating disputes between federal law enactments of
Congress and state law would be reduced, with Congress gaining a
corresponding increase in power.
The reduction of the power of the judicial branch would raise the
same concerns that a reduction in the power of the executive branch
did in Printz.25 0 Just as the reduction of the power of the President
in Printz allowed Congress to "act as effectively with the President as
without him,"2s5 the use of Article I, Section 8, Clause 10 against the
states would seem to allow Congress to act as effectively with the
courts as without them. Use of this power against the states to
require affirmative acts on the part of state governments would raise
concerns that both the power of the executive branch in
administering federal law and the power of the judicial branch
interpreting conflicts in the law were being unconstitutionally
reduced.

247.
248.

Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2378.
See id.

249. See supraSection I.B.2.
250. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2378 (explaining the importance of "the
separation and equilibration of powers between the three branches of the federal
government itself" and criticizing a reduction in the power of the President that
would allow Congress to "act as effectively without the President as with him").
251. Id
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4. Violation of Vienna Convention Duties Would Not Justify the Use
of the Exclusionary Rule
If evidence is obtained in a manner that violates a defendant's
Thus, a
constitutional rights, it is excluded from trial. 252
determination of whether the Vienna Convention implicates rights of
a constitutional nature25 3 may have bearing on whether the
suppression of evidence rule should be invoked to remedy possible
violations of the treaty. However, the suppression of evidence rule is
sometimes used in limited cases where the defendant's constitutional
rights have not been violated.2 5 4 If evidence is obtained in a manner
that is illegal but not in violation of the Constitution, it still may be
excluded if theSSpurpose of the statute making it illegal was to allow
2
for exclusion.
Because the Vienna Convention arguably does not create
personal rights, 25 6 it seems unlikely that the Vienna Convention was
intended to provide for suppression of evidence. The purpose behind
the exclusionary rule is to deter the government from violating a
person's Fourth Amendment rights.25 7 Since the Vienna Convention
does not seem to create personal rights, the policy purpose of the
exclusionary rule would be inapplicable.
Foreign countries have the right to enforce a treaty regardless25of8
whether the treaty creates personal rights for individuals.
However, in protesting a treaty violation, a foreign country would
have a difficult time trying to introduce the suppression of evidence
rule as a third party. The exclusionary rule can only be asserted by
the victim of a rights violation. 2 s 9 In the context of unwarranted
searches, the Supreme Court has ruled that the search must have
been directed against the person who is asserting the exclusionary
Thus, the exclusionary rule cannot be asserted
rule. 2 60
vicariously.

2 61

A cost-benefit approach is taken by the courts in deciding
whether to apply the exclusionary rule. 2 62 The courts consider the
252. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914); see also Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

See supraSection II.A.2.
See United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 528 (1974).
See id.
See supraSection Ml.A. 1.
See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984).
SeeReid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1957).
See United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 85 (1980).
See id.

261.

See id.; Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969).

262.

See Leon, 468 U.S. at 907-08 (weighing the costs and benefits of

preventing the prosecution from using otherwise trustworthy information gained
from an illegal search); see also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 489 (1976)
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substantial social costs that would be posed by an unbending
application of the exclusionary rule,2 63 and the effect that such an
application would have on the truth-finding functions of the judge
and jury.2 6 4 Thus, the principles advanced by the exclusionary rule
are balanced against the harm that would result from its
indiscriminate application.
This balancing is done to prevent
disrespect for the law, which would result in a windfall for the
defendant.2 65 Thus, the exclusionary rule has been confined to areas
2 66
where the remedial objectives of it are "most efficaciously served."
Therefore the application of the exclusionary rule has principally
been used when rights violations are those of a constitutional nature;
it has not been used as a personal right for defendants or as an
2 67
across the board privilege.
One court addressed whether a violation of a Vienna Convention

provision would be a reason to apply the exclusionary rule. 268 In
United States v. Enger, a defendant alleged that evidence had been
obtained in violation of his diplomatic immunity under a different
provision of the Vienna Convention. 26 9 The Court declined to
suppress the contested evidence. 2 70 The court held that the treaty
does not support using the exclusionary rule as a remedy for a
violation.2 7 1 As explained by the court, "No exclusionary rule is
explicated by... the Vienna Convention ....
I decline to infer such
a rule from the Vienna Convention in the absence of a clear
indication that the draftsmen of the Convention . . . intended to
engraft such a rule on the statutes or the treaty."272

(weighing the "utility of the exclusionary rule against the costs of extending it to
collateral review of Fourth Amendment claims").
263.
See Leon, 468 U.S. at 907 (quoting United States v. Payner, 447 U.S.

727, 734 (1980)).
264.
See Payner,447 U.S. at 734. See also Stone, 428 U.S. at 490 (stating
that applying the exclusionary rule "deflects the truthfinding process and often

frees the guilty").
265.
See Stone, 428 U.S. at 490-91 (stating that the rule, if applied
indiscriminately, may generate "disrespect for the law and the administration of
justice").

266.

Leon, 468 U.S. at 908 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.

338, 348 (1974)).

267.

See id. at 906-07 (explaining that the exclusionary rule is not a

personal right

but

rather a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard

Fourth Amendment rights through its deterrence effect).
268. See United States v. Enger, 472 F.Supp. 490, 545 (D.N.J. 1978).
269. Id This claim addressed Article 3 of the Vienna Convention. See id. at
544.
270. See id. at 545.
271. See id.
272. Id.
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Because the exclusionary rule was not provided in the treaty, it
would be difficult to justify its use.2 73 The court explained the policy
rationale for not invoking the exclusionary rule:
[A] judicial application of the exclusionary rule in an area so'
pervaded by legislative and executive interests, [sic] foreign affairs,

would be unwise when the rule cannot be said to be of universal
application in the nations of the world or, in the case of the
Convention, in the 122 signatory nations. Of all the major civil and
common law countries, the United States is the only nation that
has developed a comprehensive exclusionary rule. Other common
law jurisdictions have generally followed the traditional English
view of admitting all evidence, regardless of whether it has been
27 4
obtained in an illegal search and seizure.

One implication of the above passage is that if the United States
applied the exclusionary rule to violations of the Vienna Convention,
aliens in this country would have greater privileges than would
Americans in other signatory countries.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The Vienna Convention cannot conclusively be construed as
creating personal rights that are enforceable against the states.
Allowing the creation of new personal rights by international treaty,
enforceable against the states, would bypass the Article V mandate of
consent and participation of the states that is supposed to be used
27 5
for amending rights that individuals have against the government.
It is unclear whether state arrest practices conflict with the Vienna
Convention and whether the federal government can impose
affirmative duties on states in an attempt to remedy any such
conflict. Using the power of Congress to define crimes against the
law of nations might be a valid means for enforcing the obligations of
international treaties against the states. However, using this power
to encompass acts by state governments may upset the balance of
power between the federal government and states, and the separation
of powers in the federal government, in a manner that is not
constitutionally viable.
If affinmative duties under the Vienna
Convention can be enforced against states, the policies behind the

273.
See United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 528 (1974) (noting that
outside the scope of constitutional violations, the exclusionary rule may be used
if the purpose of the statute was to allow for its exclusion).
274. Enger, 472 F. Supp. at 545 n. 26 (opinion on motion for
reconsideration) (citations omitted).

275. See U.S. CONsT. art. V (providing for state participation in amendment
of the Constitution); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 17 (1957) (criticizing the use of
treaties that would change the Constitution outside the manner sanctioned in

Article V).
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application of the exclusionary rule would not support the use of the
rule to suppress evidence when a provision of the treaty is violated.
The above analysis may have crucial implications outside the
scope of criminal law at a time when international treaties are
becoming less concerned about foreign policy affairs, as was the case
during the Cold War, and more concerned about traditionally
domestic matters such as the environment.2 76 As treaties move away
from a foreign policy focus, they will touch upon areas of the law that
have traditionally been left under the control of state
governments 2 77-state
governments which are having their
sovereignty buoyed by the Supreme Court's recent reassertion of
federalism.
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